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PUNITIVE AND COMPENSATORY
CONTRACT DAMAGES: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF UCC, CHINESE, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Wang Jun*
I. TWO SYSTEMS
A. Compensatory Damages Under the UCC and China Foreign
Economic Contract Law (CFECL)
The general rule laid down by the Uniform Commercial Code for
damages resulting from a breach of contract is that penal damages
may not be recovered "except as specifically provided in this Act or
by other rule of law."' According to this general rule, "[t]he basic
purpose of contract damages has been to compensate the aggrieved
party, not to punish the breaching party."2
In the context of contract law, Anglo-American law generally
follows a policy of restricting recovery to compensatory damages
instead of punitive damages. Professor Alan Farnsworth suggests that
"[o]ur system ... is not directed at compulsion of promisors to
prevent breach; rather it is aimed at relief to promisees to redress
breach."3
Damages allowed by the China Foreign Economic Contract Law
(CFECL)4 are also compensatory rather than punitive. Under
* Wang Jun is an associate professor at the University of International Business and
Economics in the People's Republic of China; a member of the Chinese Private
International Law Institute; and an arbitrator on the China International Economic and
Trade Commission.
1. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1990).
2. TANG THANH TRAI LP & EDWARD J. MURPHY, SALES AND CREDIT TRANSAC-
TIONS HANDBOOK § 5.39, at 298 (1985).
3. E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv.
1146, 1147 (1970).
4. China Foreign Economic Contract Law (CFECL) is the statute specially applied
to contract relationships between a Chinese enterprise or another type of Chinese
economic organization, and a foreign enterprise, person, or another type of foreign
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CFECL, "damages by a party for breach of contract should be equal
to the loss suffered by the other party as a consequence of the
breach."5 Today in China, both in foreign economic litigation and in
the arbitration of the China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), claims for punitive damages are
seldom upheld unless the law applied to the contract is that of a
foreign country where punitive damages are allowed. In fact, few
cases can be found in which claims for punitive damages were
supported for breach of contracts between Chinese and foreign
parties.
B. Punitive Damages Under the German Civil Code and China
Economic Contract Law
In Germany a party in breach may be punished. According to
German Civil Code (GCC), where parties agree that the breaching
party has a duty to pay damages for nonperformance of an obligation
or failure to perform in a proper manner, damages may be awarded
even though enforcing the agreement will result in punishment.
6
China Economic Contract Law (CECL),7 which governs Chinese
native economic transactions, also bears a pronounced penal color.'
CECL employs a system of "double-returned-earnest money."9 If a
party paying earnest money fails to fulfill the terms of the contract,
that party loses the right to have the earnest money returned;
however, if the party receiving the earnest money fails to perform,
economic organization.
5. CHINA FOREIGN ECONOMIC CONTRACr LAW [CFECL] art. 19 (1993) (P.R.C.),
translated in CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS, 1 BUSINESS REGULATIONS 6627
(1993).
6. BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] art. 339 (F.R.G.), translated in THE GERMAN
CIVIL CODE 56 (Simon L. Goren trans., rev. ed. 1994).
7. China Economic Contract Law (CECL), implemented in 1981 and amended in
1993, governs the economic contracts between two Chinese parties. CECL, along with
various regulations for the implementation of CECL and the judicial explanations of
CECL by the Chinese Supreme People's Court, jointly constitute a system resolving
economic contract disputes between Chinese contracting parties.
8. Learning about this statute is of significance to a foreign investor since enterprises
with foreign capital set up in China are characterized as Chinese enterprises under Chinese
law. Therefore CECL governs the contractual disputes between this kind of enterprise and
other Chinese enterprises.
9. In China earnest money usually means the sum paid by one party who, under a
contract, has a duty to pay prior to the other party's performance. Sometimes no distinct
difference exists between earnest money and advance payment.
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that party must pay twice the amount to the other party.10 For a
sale contract, the paying party is usually the buyer and the sum paid
is often equivalent to one third of the total value of the contract. A
buyer who repudiates the contract cannot get the sum returned in an
action.
Other types of punitive damages include liquidated and legal
damages for breach. CECL provides that
if one of the parties concerned is in breach of an economic
contract, it shall pay breach fees to the other party. In a
case where breach of contract causes the other party to incur
losses which exceed the breach fees, the party in breach of
the contract shall pay additional compensation to make up
the balance."
Under the Opinions on Several Questions for the Implementation of
CECL (Opinions) delivered by the Supreme People's Court of the
People's Republic of China, 2
breaching damages are the sum which shall be paid by the
party who fails to perform an economic contract or fails to
completely perform the contract in fault to the other party
according to contract or law, no matter whether the breach
has led to the loss suffered by the other party or not.
This explanation demonstrates that CECL damages for breach are
punitive in nature to the breaching party. Under the Opinions,
[b]reaching damages include legal breaching damages and
liquidated breaching damages. The former is clearly
provided by statutes-for example, Regulations on Contracts
for the Purchase and Sale of Industrial and Mineral Products
(RCPSIMP) and Regulations on Contracts for the Purchase
and Sale of Agricultural By-products (RCPSABP). 4 The
10. CHINA ECONOMIC CONTRAcr LAW [CECLI art. 14 (amended 1993) (P.R.C.),
translated in CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS, 1 BUSINESS REGULATION 6405, 6407
(1993).
11. Id. art. 31, translated in CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUsINESs, 1 BUSINESS
REGULATION 6423.
12. The Opinions on Several Questions for the Implementation of CECL [hereinafter
Opinions] were delivered in 1984 and have been followed by people's courts at different
levels and in different areas in China.
13. I& at 2(2)(1).
14. The State Council of the People's Republic of China formulated the RCPSIMP
and RCPSABP in 1984 for implementation of CECL. See JEROME A. COHEN, CONTRACr
LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 69 (1988).
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latter is agreed by contractual parties when contracts are
made. If there is no provision stipulating breaching damages
in contracts, breaching damages can be ascertained under
the concerned regulations in force at the time when con-
tracts are signed. 5
A variety of regulations, and detailed rules concerning different
sorts of contracts, provide for the amount of breaching damages or
the method of ascertaining breaching damages."6 For instance, the
RCPSIMP guarantees that the seller must pay the buyer damages for
breach of contract if the seller fails to deliver the goods.17 The
specific ratio between the breaching damages and the total value of
the contract may be agreed by the seller and buyer when they sign the
contract. 8
However, where no provision in the contract controls liquidated
damages, and the seller fails to deliver goods, the RCPSIMP provides
the following guidelines:
Breach of contract damages for general-purpose products
shall be 1 to 5 percent of the total value of the goods that
the supplier fails to deliver; breach of contract damages for
special-purpose products shall be 10 to 30 percent of the
total value of the portion of the goods that the supplier fails
to deliver.'9
II. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM LIQUIDATED DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACr
Liquidated damages for breach of contract creates two distinct
problems: maintaining reasonable limits on remedies and avoiding
undue punishment. The first problem occurs in countries recognizing
only compensatory damages for breach of contract, and the second
must be resolved by countries allowing punitive damages. China,
which has adopted both compensatory and punitive damages, cannot
avoid either problem.
15. Opinions, supra note 12, at 2(2)(2).
16. For example, Regulations on Contracts for Construction; Regulations on Contracts
for Property Insurance; Detailed Rules for Storage Contracts; Detailed Rules for Railway
Transportation of Goods; and Detailed Rules for Highway Transportation of Goods.
17. REGULATIONS ON CONTRACTS FOR THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF INDUSTRIAL
AND MINERAL PRODUCTS, art. 35(1) (1984), translated in COHEN, supra note 14, at 79.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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A. How to Make Reasonable Remedies for Liquidated Breaching
Damages
1. The answer from the UCC
The UCC maintains reasonable limits on remedies by requiring
that
[d]amages for breach by either party may be liquidated in
the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach,
the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or
nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.
A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void
as a penalty.2
Generally, where damages are difficult to ascertain based on the
circumstances of the case, liquidated damages will be regarded as
reasonable unless the amount of the damages is excessively large.
The California case Blank v. Borden2' illustrates this rule. A real
estate broker entered into a contract with a landlord to sell the
landlord's weekend home.' The contract granted the broker the
exclusive and irrevocable right to sell the property for seven months
from the date of the agreement.' It further provided that the agent
would receive six percent of the selling price if the property was sold
during this period.24 If the owner withdrew the property from sale
without the agent's consent, the agent would receive six percent of the
price for the property stated in the agreement.' Two months later,
while the broker diligently attempted to obtain a purchaser, the
landlord, without justification, orally notified the broker that the
property was no longer for sale.'
The California Supreme Court concluded that the
withdrawal-from-sale clause in an exclusive right-to-sell contract does
not constitute a void penalty provision.' The broker is only entitled
20. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1990).
21. 11 Cal. 3d 963, 524 P.2d 127, 115 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1974).
22. Id. at 966, 524 P.2d at 128, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
23. Id.
24. 1l
25. Id.
26. Id. at 967, 524 P.2d at 129, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
27. Id. at 970, 524 P.2d at 130, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
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to compensation upon sale of the property.e The court reasoned
that when a sale is effected, the compensation received is a percent-
age of the sale price regardless of the amount of effort expended by
the broker.2 9 Therefore, the "damage" sustained by the broker did
not depend on the amount of effort made prior to the breach but
rather on the value of the lost opportunity to make a sale and thereby
receive compensation." "The determination of this value would
clearly degenerate into an examination of fictional probabilities-e.g.,
whether the broker, if allowed to continue... efforts for the full term
of the contract, would have [successfully located] a buyer and
effect[ed] a sale."'"
A distinct problem arises when the method for anticipating harm
caused by breach of contract is reasonable but liquidated damages
significantly exceed the actual harm. For example, a contract between
a Chinese and a U.S. corporation for the sale of one cargo of
metallurgical coke provided that ash in the goods should be under
11.5%. However, if the percentage was between 11.5 and 12%, the
Chinese seller would pay the buyer $1.00 per metric ton (mt) for
every 1% of the increase of ash, and, if the percentage was between
12 and 13%, the seller would pay $3.00/mt for every 1% of the
increase. The contract further stipulated that the buyer could reject
goods when the ash was above 13%. Other specifications controlled
moisture content, size, sulfur content, and volatile matter content,
with corresponding price reductions for nonconformity. Another term
in the contract provided that U.S. law would govern disputes between
the contractual parties. Upon delivery, the buyer found that the ash
was over 15% and that there were some other inconformities with the
specifications. Rather than reject the coke, the buyer chose to reduce
the price, which, under the contract, amounted to a substantial part
of the total value of the contract. However, the buyer failed to notify
the seller of the actual harm sustained.32 Suppose that the reduction
of the price under the contract reflected exactly the reduced quality
28. Id at 972, 524 P.2d at 132, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
29. Id
30. Id. at 972-73, 524 P.2d at 132, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
31. Id at 973, 524 P.2d at 132, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 36. Similar examples can be found
in the case of breach of a covenant not to compete, where the losses resulting from such
a breach "were wholly uncertain and incapable of estimation otherwise than by mere
conjecture." Williams v. Dakin & Bacon, 22 Wend. 200, 208 (N.Y. 1839).
32. This dispute remains unresolved. Concerns about expensive attorney's fees nlay
account for the Chinese seller's reluctance to sue the buyer in an American court.
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of the goods and was therefore reasonable. If the buyer resold the
cargo at the original price, in a rising market, the buyer would suffer
no loss due to the deficient quality. The question becomes whether
the contract terms fixing the damages are void.
Some U.S. courts hold that "if damages could be easily ascer-
tained, liquidated damages would be of little use since any departure
from the actual harm would be looked upon as unreasonable."33
Taken literally, however, under UCC section 2-718(1), liquidated
damages in a contract are enforceable if they are reasonable in light
of anticipated harm. Hence, in the coke hypothetical, a reasonable
relationship between the price reduction and the quality validates the
schedule of damages in the contract.
Both of the above views may be too extreme. Generally, the
amount of liquidated damages must be reasonable. However,
determining whether liquidated damages are reasonable in light of
anticipated or actual harm does not ensure that they are reasonable
in light of the totality of the circumstances. Many U.S. courts feel
that even if the estimate is deemed to be reasonable, the evidence of
actual damage may still be relevant. In Equitable Lumber Corp. v.
IPA Land Development Corp." the New York Court of Appeals
held that the UCC test was disjunctive-valid if reasonable in light of
either anticipated or actual harm.35 But even if the test is met, the
clause may still be invalid under the last sentence of the subsec-
tion-"[a] term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void
as a penalty"36-- if "it is so unreasonably large that it serves as a
penalty rather than a good faith attempt to pre-estimate damages."37
Another court said that the absence of harm may result in closer
judicial scrutiny of the contractual penalty.
38
2. Limitations on liquidated damages under CFECL
CFECL includes a liquidated damages provision for contracts
between Chinese economic enterprises and foreigners:
33. Interstate Indus. Uniform Rental Serv., Inc. v. Couri Pontiac, Inc., 335 A.2d 913,
921 (Me. 1976); see also Hubbard Business Plaza v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co., 649 F.
Supp. 1310, 1316 (D. Nev. 1986) (holding that in Nevada, liquidated damages must not be
disproportional to the actual damages).
34. 344 N.E.2d 391 (1976).
35. ld at 395.
36. U.C.C. § 2-718(1).
37. Equitable Lumber, 344 N.E.2d at 395.
38. Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co., 220 A.2d 263 (Conn. 1966).
Apr il 1996] 1077
1078 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1071
[Contracting] parties may agree upon ... a certain
amount of liquidated damages... if one party breaches the
contract; and may also agree upon a method for calculating
the damages arising [as a possible consequence of the]
breach of contract.
The above-mentioned liquidated damages shall be
regarded as compensation for the loss caused by breach of
contract. However, if the liquidated damages agreed upon
in the contract [are] much more or less than the loss, the
parties may request an arbitration body or court to [reduce]
or increase [them] appropriately?
9
Under this provision, the court may adjust liquidated damages in
light of the specific circumstances of a particular case. However, the
stated policy of CFECL, limiting damages to compensation rather
than punishment, prevents a punitive result. Chinese law does not
articulate factors to be considered by courts when adjusting liquidated
damages, so UCC section 2-718(1) may be used for reference.
B. How to Avoid Undue Punishment Caused by Liquidated
Breaching Damages
1. The rules under the German Civil Code
Even civil law countries recognizing punitive damages place
certain limitations on agreed damages. Under the GCC, if the
amount of punitive liquidated damages is excessively large and the
debtor requests a reduction, a court may reduce the damages to an
appropriate amount.4° However, the court's power to reduce
damages is limited. A court may only assert such power upon request
by the parties who are so-called debtors-parties who have breached
contracts and then face the cost of liquidated damages. In addition,
when ascertaining the amount of damages, the court must consider all
the normal interests that creditors are entitled to in addition to the
interests in property.4' In deciding whether the amount of liquidated
damages is excessive, the court will look beyond the economic loss
and consider other losses, including any loss in reputation. This rule
39. CFECL art. 20, translated in CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS, 1 BUSINESS
REGULATION 6627 (1993).
40. BGB art. 343(1), translated in THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE 56-57 (Simon L. Goren
trans., rev. ed. 1994).
41. Id. art. 343(1).
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may lead to much larger damages than those ascertained under the
UCC.
2. The rules delivered by the Chinese Supreme People's Court
No special provision in CECL addresses liquidated damages for
breach. However, the Chinese Supreme People's Court Opinions42
offer rules on the nature of liquidated damages, and on the devices to
avoid excessive punishment.
Under the Opinions the breaching party must pay liquidated
damages regardless of whether the breach caused any loss.43 In the
same section the Opinions stated that: "Where a contract stipulates
damages.., no more damages other than that stipulated shall be paid
if the economic loss can be recovered by payment of the stipulated
damages."'  According to this definition, liquidated damages are
compensatory when the value of actual harm exceeds the amount of
liquidated damages, and under such circumstances the aggrieved party
is not entitled to damages beyond actual harm. However, when the
value of the actual harm falls below the amount of liquidated
damages, the difference paid by the breaching party becomes punitive
in nature. Liquidated damages become entirely punitive in their
nature when a breach of contract has caused no loss.
To avoid excessive punishment caused by liquidated damages, the
Opinions offer the following provision:
The amount of damages can. be agreed [to] by both parties,
but the amount cannot be reduced where a contract is
breached intentionally. For negligent breach of contract,
damages may be reduced to an appropriate amount but only
if the breaching party [has] financial difficulties and requests
the reduction, or the breach has caused no economic harm
to the other party.4'
This provision demonstrates that liquidated damages are generally
enforced unless a party negligently-rather than intentional-
ly-breaches the contract, and requests a reduction in damages either
claiming financial hardship, or demonstrates that the breach has
caused no harm to the other party.
42. See supra note 12.
43. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
44. Opinions, supra note 12, at 2(2)(1).
45. Id. at 2(2)(3).
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III. COMMENTARY ON THE Two SYSTEMS
A. The International Tendency
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG), effective in 1988, and adopted by both
the United States and the People's Republic of China, provides that
"[d]amages for breach of contract by one party consists of a sum
equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party
as a consequence of the breach.
'4 6
This provision confirms that damages for breach of contract can
only be compensatory, not punitive. It also demonstrates that most
countries recognize the principle limiting damages for breach of
contract to compensation rather than punishment, at least in the
context of international transactions.47
B. The Necessity for Deterring Breach of Contract by Punishment?
Advocates of punitive damages maintain that punishing the
breaching party offers the most effective way to prevent breach of
contract. However, the judicial practice of those countries demon-
strates that compensatory damages alone may achieve this goal. As
long as a decision or arbitration award can be enforced, the breaching
party cannot benefit from a breach of contract if faced with compen-
satory damages. If a seller refuses to deliver goods at a price
stipulated by contract in order to avoid sustaining a loss due to a rise
in the market price, the buyer under a compensatory damages scheme
has two options. The buyer may buy replacement goods and recover
the difference between the contract price and the price in the
substitute transaction,48 or the buyer may recover the difference
between the price fixed by contract and the market price without
purchase.49 Generally, recovery under either option is the same
since the buyer will normally buy the replacement goods at market price.
46. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11, 1980, art. 74, 19 I.L.M. 668, 688 (hereinafter CISG].
47. By May 1994, apart from the Anglo-American countries which generally recognize
only compensatory damages for breach of contract, many civil law countries have accepted
the Convention, including Argentina, Austria, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
48. U.C.C. § 2-712 (1990); CISG, supra note 46, art. 75.
49. U.C.C. § 2-713; CISG, supra note 46, art. 76.
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Under each formula the loss that the seller attempts to avoid by
refusing delivery of goods equals the damages the seller has to pay
because of the breach. Furthermore, in such a case, the seller in
breach ordinarily has to pay costs incurred during a lawsuit or
arbitration. In many cases such litigation costs exceed the loss that
the party in breach tried to avoid by breaching. Since breach of
contract may cause direct and natural harm as well as consequential
harm, the aggrieved party is entitled to claims for both unless the
aggregate exceeds the loss that the party in breach can foresee at the
time of the contract's formation."
C. The Malpractice of Punitive Damages
There are many disadvantages of punitive damages for breach of
contract. Punitive damages increase the risk of doing business and
discourage people from getting involved in commercial transactions.
Today in China enterprises with abundant funds and good reputations
are very likely to be sued. Under certain circumstances, even for a
breach arising from third-party negligence,5 an enterprise may be
required to pay an additional penalty beyond compensation for a loss.
Where the breaching party is an enterprise with limited funds or a
bad reputation, the aggrieved party often goes to court faced with the
difficulty of enforcing a favorable decision. Enterprises without credit
can easily avoid punitive damages by dissolving, while successful
business organizations are compelled to become defendants. In the
end such penalties may discourage business transactions instead of
protecting them.
Punitive damages also encourage litigation. An example is found
in Yantai Development Zone v. China Fodder Import & Export Corp.,
heard by the Yantai Municipal Court in the Shandong Province of the
People's Republic of China in 1994. The defendant was obligated by
contract to send one cargo of fishmeal exported from Peru to Yantai
before September 1, 1994. However, the cargo vessel did not arrive
at Yantai until September 15, 1994, because the ship was in bad
condition and the U.S. Coast Guard detained it for more than a
50. U.C.C. § 2-715(2); CISG, supra note 46, art. 74.
51. For example, A promises B to sell specific goods to B, and B promises to sell the
same to C. Later, A fails to deliver the goods to B, and hence B cannot deliver to C. In
this case, B breaches the contract with C because of A's breach of the contract with B.
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month for repairs in Hawaii.52 The market price of fishmeal was
rising, and the delay itself did not cause any loss to the plaintiff.
However, another Chinese corporation, which bought the goods from
the plaintiff, sued the plaintiff for the delay in order to obtain
double-returned-earnest money.53 Under these circumstances the
plaintiff had to sue the defendant shipper. In the end, the lower court
overruled the claim for double-returned-earnest money, and the
plaintiff and defendant reconciled.
Penalties for breach of contract also frequently result in uncertain
effects. In countries allowing punitive damages, the amount of
damages for breach of contract depends not only on the amount of
direct and consequential economic damages, but also on various
factors including harm to reputation,54 the fault of the breaching
party5 5 -willful breach or negligent breach, and the financial situa-
tion of the breaching party.56 This formula contributes to the
uncertainty of remedies.
IV. CONCLUSION
One reason currently advanced in China for the adoption of
punitive damages following a breach of a native economic contract is
that the planned economic system still plays an important role in the
country's national economy. It is suggested that the most effective
way to prevent breach of economic contracts and ensure the comple-
tion of scheduled economic plans is to punish the parties in breach.
A typical example is the provision of the RCPSABP5 7 providing
that a seller who has not delivered agricultural by-products shall pay
the buyer damages amounting to between one and twenty percent of
the value of the unperformed part of the contract. At the same time,
the breaching seller shall return the benefit received from the resale
to the state. The severe punishment and forfeiture are intended to
ensure grain purchase by the buyer, which in the eyes of the
legislature is primarily the state.
52. The U.S. Coast Guard detained the vessel pursuant to the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, and the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships.
53. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., supra part lI.B.1.
55. See, ag., supra part II.B.2.
56. See, e.g., supra part II.B.2.
57. REGULATIONS ON CONTRACTS FOR THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF AGRICULTUR-
AL BY-PRODUCTS art. 17(l) (1984), translated in COHEN, supra note 14, at 65-66.
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The system of punitive damages cannot guarantee the perfor-
mance of contracts. To make contracting parties keep their promises,
the key lies in the parties' credit. To vindicate its honor, a credible
party will not go back on its word; to avoid becoming a defendant, it
dare not repudiate the contract. Accordingly, the best means to guard
against breach of contract is to develop security devices to guarantee
the interests of the contractual party standing by the contract, to
consummate a compensatory damages system in the contract field,
and to ameliorate judicial organs and enforcement devices.
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